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The Truth in the Falsification of Artificial Intelligence 
Abstract 
 The influence Karl Popper’s falsificationist model has had on the scientific method and the 
demarcation problem is troublesome for the field of artificial intelligence (AI). According to Popper, the 
falsifiability of a hypothesis is a necessary condition for its scientific validity. Because the falsificationist 
model has been formative in the development of modern philosophy of science, it has become the primary 
way in which we demarcate the scientific from the non-scientific. However, as a consequence of our 
current, limited understanding of mental properties—such as intelligence, thought, and personal 
identity—I argue that it is unclear whether hypotheses concerning the design of artificial intelligence—
particularly strong AI—are truly falsifiable. If this is the case, society’s approach to and attitude towards 
future AI research and development regarding scientific methodology is in need of reevaluation. I 
conclude that we should either (1) aim to better define the concepts in philosophy of mind that we 
attribute to artificial intelligence to understand how they can be falsified in order to make quicker and 
more meaningful progress in AI or (2) recognize that there are aspects of AI that simply cannot be 
falsified and adapt our current scientific methodology to something more appropriate and inclusive than 
Popper’s falsificationist principles. 
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The Truth in the Falsification of Artificial Intelligence 
Research and development in the area of artificial intelligence is particularly interesting to 
technology-loving modern society. To computer scientists, cognitive scientists, philosophers of science 
and the mind, and laypersons alike, it is currently up for debate (1) exactly what artificial intelligence 
entails and (2) whether it is truly possible to design. For the following argument in this paper, artificial 
intelligence (AI) will be defined as “the subfield of Computer Science devoted to developing programs 
that enable computers to display behavior that can (broadly) be characterized as intelligent” (Russell & 
Norvig, 2010)1. There are usually considered to be two types of AI: “weak AI” (also referred as “narrow” 
or “applied” AI) and “strong AI”. The former refers to machines that are neither self-aware nor intelligent 
in a generalizable way, but are able to complete well-defined yet complex (often human) tasks within 
narrow domains, like playing a game of Blackjack or recognizing and processing speech. The latter, 
strong AI, are machines that have reached a level of general intelligence that reflects, or possibly 
supersedes, that of human intelligence. This type of intelligence often includes the presence of conscious 
thought, although the nature of consciousness itself is still contested within cognitive science disciplines2. 
It should be noted that to date, scientists and academics are overall in consensus that we have not 
produced strong AI. Part of the reason for our failure to produce generalizable intelligence in machines is 
that over the past seventy-five years, the field of artificial intelligence has faced a number of problems 
due to its interdisciplinary nature. One of the disciplines that frequently poses a challenge for AI is 
philosophy, specifically the areas of philosophy of science and philosophy of mind. 
Philosophy of science embodies a broad scope of knowledge related to our study of the world, 
and one of the ways it influences science is by examining and propagating scientific methodologies. In 
Western education, we are indoctrinated from an early age with a particular methodology of science: 
begin with an observation, acquire background knowledge, formulate a hypothesis, design a procedure, 
conduct an experiment, analyze its data, and conclude whether the original hypothesis has been falsified 
based on this data or whether it is supported by its results. This method of inquiry is favored by 
falsificationism, which is a theoretical approach to science that has helped shape modern scientific 
investigation. The scientific method we follow is so familiar to us that we rarely question it; however, it is 
                                               
1 Artificial intelligence can be approached from several different angles and disciplines, some of which take a human-centered 
approach and are concerned with modeling human intelligence, others of which take a rationalist approach and are concerned 
with modeling intelligent behavior that is not grounded in (and may exceed) human ability. For an overview of four approaches 
to AI, see Introduction in “Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach” (Russell, S. J. & Norvig, P., 2010). See also the “One 
Hundred Year Study on Artificial Intelligence” (A100) by Stone et al., 2016 for a discussion on how to define AI and a slightly 
different definition of intelligence. 
 
2 See Andy Clark’s “Consciousness and the Meta-Hard Problem” in Mindware (Clark, 2014) for an overview of definitions of, 
approaches to, and challenges regarding the nature of consciousness. See also David Chalmers’ The Conscious Mind (Chalmers, 
1996) for another discussion on consciousness. 
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not the only—or even the first—proposed way to analyze and interpret the world according to philosophy, 
it is just the model that modern Western science favors. 
The falsificationist model is a relatively recent concept in the general scheme of philosophy; 
philosopher Karl Popper first presented the model as a critique of the inductive scientific method in the 
twentieth century3. Under Popper’s falsificationism, the falsifiability of a hypothesis is a necessary 
condition for its scientific merit. If a hypothesis cannot be disproven, or it is not understood what it would 
conceivably look like for it to be disproven, then there is no way to confirm or disconfirm with certainty 
whether it is valid science. Since the falsificationist model has been influential in the development of 
modern philosophy of science, it has become the primary way in which we demarcate the scientific from 
the non-scientific. One problem with this, however, is that some seemingly-scientific fields do not lend 
well to falsificationism, which threatens the very validity of the body of work. The field of artificial 
intelligence is one field that exemplifies this. Unfortunately, if the principles of falsificationism are what 
AI must adhere to for its developments to be considered scientific, we should be worried. As a 
consequence of our current, limited understanding of the mind—including the concepts of intelligence, 
thought, and personal identity—as well as our methods for delineating these concepts, it is unclear 
whether hypotheses concerning the design of artificial intelligence—particularly strong AI—are truly 
falsifiable. If this is the case, society’s approach to and attitude towards future AI research and 
development regarding scientific methodology is likely in need of reevaluation. 
When we bring into question the falsifiability of designing AI, we find there are those who claim 
our ability to design AI is falsifiable and, in fact, it has already been falsified. Historically, the best-
known argument for the falsifiability of AI is contained in the 1972 published work, “Artificial 
Intelligence: A General Survey,” commonly referred to as the Lighthill report. In his report, 
mathematician James Lighthill broke AI research down into three categories based on its goals:  
1. Category A research aimed to automate specific human tasks by creating machines, 
known as Advanced Automatons, capable of performing the same tasks. 
2. Category B research aimed to “bridge the gap” between Category A and Category C by 
unifying the field of AI through the physical process of Building Robots. 
3. Category C research aimed to create Computer-based models of the Central Nervous 
System in order to investigate and understand human intellect from a neurobiological and 
psychological level. 
                                               
3 This argument was published in Popper’s work “Conjectures and Refutations” (Popper, 1963) and has since been both 
embraced and criticized by philosophers and scientists. Whether or not Popper’s model is correct or incorrect is beside the point 
at the moment. In order for the philosophical foundations of AI to be testable and falsifiable by the modern scientific method—
which has undoubtedly been influenced by falsificationism—they must first be well-defined. This is true regardless of whether 
the AI is designed to model human level intelligence or beyond-human level intelligence. 
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Lighthill praised AI research in the areas of automation, such as information retrieval, speech recognition, 
and machine translation (Category A). He also praised research in the simulation of human physiology 
(Category C). However, he harshly critiqued research in language processing and robotics (Category B) 
(Lighthill, 1972). Essentially, he supported weak AI, but not strong AI. At the time it was published and 
in the two decades to follow, the Lighthill report was received by society as evidence that the field of AI 
was making little progress and had essentially failed to address its key issues such as the “no topic” 
problem4, the frame problem5 and combinatorial explosion6. Forty years ago, Lighthill’s pessimistic 
outlook suggested the future of AI was bleak; some took it as an implication that the claim stating we 
could and would be able design strong AI was a false claim. That is, the proposition of generalizable 
artificial intelligence, as it was characterized by Lighthill, was not possible and therefore it had been 
falsified.  
Since AI research in the areas of language processing and robotics (Category B) has progressed 
since the publication of the Lighthill report, it is clear that the future of AI is no longer regarded as a 
hopeless case. Much of the early work in artificial intelligence research was limited by physical symbol 
system and information processing approaches7. In the 1990s, the connectionist approach to AI revived 
previous interest in artificial neural networks and dynamic systems. Neural networks, by exhibiting 
graceful degradation, learning pattern recognition from experience, and implementing backpropagation 
algorithms, have since made progress in overcoming issues that plagued brittle early AI (Bostrom, 2014). 
In the past decade, the open-source movement and the field of data science have also accelerated the 
growth and capabilities of what we call ‘AI’ (Agrawal, McHale, & Oettl, 2017).  In spite of these signs of 
progress, current attempts at AI still lack a developed description of the “intelligence” portion of 
“artificial intelligence”: how cognition, thinking, and personal identity are described and evaluated in 
artificially intelligent systems, if they can be at all. 
Because it is the case that intelligence and thought are concepts that are inherently tied to the 
investigation of artificial intelligence, it is fair to ask how we are to define them. Unfortunately, current 
work in AI produces no satisfying answers. One of the most well-known, though still contended, 
                                               
4 This is John Haugeland’s term for when there is no relevant stereotype (something used to conceptualize knowledge in an 
organized way) to associate relevant information within a given situation. See Chapter 5: Real Machines in Artificial Intelligence: 
The Very Idea (Haugeland, 1985). 
 
5 Dennett coined this term in his paper “Cognitive Wheels: The Frame Problem of AI” (Dennett, 1985) to describe the challenge 
of logically representing the effects of actions without having to represent explicitly a large number of not-relevant effects that 
are intuitively obvious (to humans). The solution to the frame problem is knowing what knowledge is relevant at a given time. 
 
6 This is a term used to describe when there are more possibilities for a given thing than there is space or time to keep track of 
 said thing and its possibilities, much less program them into AI. It is the reason why the frame problem is an issue for early AI. 
 
7 A more complete picture of the historical development of artificial intelligence can be found Introduction in “Artificial 
Intelligence: A Modern Approach” (Russell, S. J. & Norvig, P., 2010) and an overview of the shortcomings of the Physical 
Symbol System hypothesis is available in Chapter 2 of Mindware (Clark, 2014). 
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indications of intelligent thought within the field of AI is the Turing Test. Alan Turing, a mid-twentieth 
century computer scientist, developed the Turing Test as a method of validating machine intelligence. The 
test is Turing's own variation of the “imitation game;” it requires a human and a machine, both of which 
are hidden behind a curtain, and an investigator, who does not know the identities of either entity. If the 
investigator is unable to determine which entity is the machine and which is the human based upon their 
answers to questions, then the machine passes the Turing Test, at which point the entity’s behavior 
sufficiently deems it capable of intelligent thought. If the investigator correctly detects which entity is the 
machine, then the machine does not pass the test, but that does not necessarily mean that it is incapable of 
intelligent thought (Turing, 1950).  
The problems with the Turing Test and its position on intelligence and thought are multi-faceted. 
First, we must consider whether this indication of intelligent thought is an adequate definition of 
intelligence, assuming there is even a single correct definition of intelligence in the first place. 
Intelligence can, and has been, defined in a variety of ways, by multiple disciplines, and rarely are these 
definitions consistent8. Without a clear understanding of the conditions that constitute the notion of 
intelligence, it will be difficult—if not impossible—to falsify it. Of course, there are similar questions 
about what constitutes thought—is it purely computation or something more? —and how science must go 
about evaluating the existence or non-existence, as well as the depth, of thought in order to make it 
adequately falsifiable. The Turing Test is ultimately a behaviorist method which tries to simplify the 
problem of falsification by using observable behavior (the machine’s responses) to make the 
determination of intelligence. However, behaviorism has problems of its own. In cognitive psychology, 
behaviorism was replaced by the information processing paradigm in the late twentieth century, and it is 
the information processing paradigm that has informed the majority of AI research. More recently, the 
paradigm has begun to shift towards the embodied perspective, more broadly known as situated cognition 
in philosophy9. Cognitive psychology recognizes that there is more to the mind than its behavior10, so 
should this not also be the case for artificially-intelligent, thinking minds? 
Another argument in support of falsifying the legitimacy of AI lies in weak AI that may be 
initially mistaken for strong AI. Examples of this are bots, such as customer service bots or chatbots, 
which humans interact with through web and mobile applications. Based on initial interactions with a bot, 
                                               
8 This definition often varies by discipline within the cognitive sciences. Cognitive psychology has taken multiple approaches to 
defining intelligence. Psychometric general (g) intelligence, Sternberg’s triarchic theory, and Gardner's multiple intelligences 
theory are three ways in which intelligence has been defined. In philosophy, as Copeland points out in What is Artificial 
Intelligence? (Copeland, 2000) there is no cohesive definition of intelligence, artificial or otherwise, by which to evaluate AI. 
 
9 Embodiment maintains that the thinking mind is part of the body and, as such, is influenced by interactions with the external 
world. See Andy Clark’s Mindware for further discussion of the embodied perspective. 
 
10 It should be noted that exactly what more constitutes the mind, besides behavior, and how to evaluate this is unclear and 
remains the subject of debate in cognitive psychology and other disciplines in cognitive science. 
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humans might assume that the customer service assistant on the IKEA website who asks “Can I help 
you?” through a chat window is actually another human at a service center somewhere in the world. 
However, after asking the virtual customer service assistant several conversational questions and 
receiving awkward, possibly nonsensical responses, humans will conclude that the assistant does not 
possess human-level intelligence, nor is it human, and therefore they have falsified the existence of strong 
AI in the bot11. There are multiple problems with this claim, all of which relate to the Turing Test. Like 
Turing’s test for intelligent thought, falsifying the intelligence of a bot requires a behaviorist approach, 
which offers a worryingly incomplete picture of the mind, artificial or otherwise. Also, as stated above, 
passing the Turing Test is not a necessary condition for intelligence or the ability to think. That is: if the 
human correctly detects the bot, then the bot does not pass the test, but that does not necessarily mean that 
it is not intelligent or is not thinking. While it is true that we may all generally agree that the bot has not 
exhibited the behavior to have reached or exceeded human-level intelligence, we should be cautious about 
writing off entities as intelligence-lacking so quickly. Humans, for example, suffer from awkward and 
occasionally nonsensical responses, especially in instances where we lack sufficient knowledge about a 
topic. For example, consider monolingual foreign immigrants in a new country — their lack of 
behaviorally appropriate responses may be as strange as those of a machine, but it would be rather 
insulting to pronounce that the immigrants lack intelligence. Therefore, simple behaviorist approaches to 
falsifying AI are only somewhat helpful in distinguishing intelligence and certainly do not offer an 
adequate definition of the concept. For a more acceptable, valid scientific approach to falsifiability of AI, 
we should look beyond behaviorism and also consider other components of intelligence, such as 
consciousness. 
Recently, academics in artificial intelligence and related disciplines have begun to voice some of 
these concerns. In 2015, AI academics and technology professionals signed an Open Letter on AI 
outlining the importance of investing in making AI more “robust” (e.g. capable) and beneficial to society. 
They followed this up with a longer report which maintains that AI has made significant progress and it 
will continue to make progress, so therefore it is valuable and even necessary to outline the areas of 
research that AI should prioritize in the coming years in order to solve current problems and preemptively 
address potential problems (Russell, Dewey, & Tegmark, 2015). Within this report, scholars raise 
questions of validity and verification in computer science research, specifically regarding strong AI. A 
major concern for AI is that it should be safely robust, meaning that it does only what we expect it to and 
does it well. In other words, it behaves as programmed. However, if we are to build AI that supposedly 
reaches (or exceeds) human level intelligence, it is going to gain knowledge and understanding in a way 
                                               
11 In fact, the bot is actually an example of weak AI, since it is programmed to do a defined, limited task, which is help people 
shop for furniture. Asking the IKEA customer service assistant what to have for breakfast is, unsurprisingly, not within the 
knowledge domain of its task. 
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that might not be known to us. Neural networks are—by the standards of strong AI—a primitive example 
of this today. With strong AI’s ability to learn according to its own algorithms, we will not have a way 
other than its behavior to verify that it is learning what it is intended to learn, or determine really what 
kind of knowledge we are testing the AI for at all (Russell et al., 2015). The “brain” of the AI is a black 
box. Then, the question becomes: how do we know how and by what standard to evaluate what AI is 
doing and whether it is doing what it is supposed to when it is continually adapting and teaching itself? Is 
machine intelligence, no matter how we define it, falsifiable? 
Finally, the semantic and conceptual concerns about intelligence and thought are connected to 
axiological concerns about both the scope and the falsifiability of personhood and personal identity. 
Assuming human level AI is achieved, under what circumstances, if any, should we grant it personhood? 
Currently, we do not even know how to validate or invalidate personhood in human beings. Common 
puzzles in philosophy of mind, cognitive science, and bioethics examine how we should classify 
amnesiacs and people in persistent vegetative state. The same issue of personhood’s scope is just as 
relevant to artificial “persons”. If AI were to become sentient enough to declare itself intelligent, thinking, 
or a person, we have no method by which to evaluate whether its claims are true or false. A related 
thought experiment in philosophy of mind that can be used to demonstrate this problem is the 
philosophical zombie. Proposed by David Chalmers, the philosophical zombie is an entity that is 
outwardly indistinguishable from a human being, but internally lacks the sentience and conscious 
experiences of humans. Chalmers uses the philosophical zombie to craft an argument against physicalism, 
since the conceivability of consciousness-lacking zombies implies that it is something immaterial, rather 
than material, which forms consciousness (Chalmers, 1996).12 However, Chalmers’ thought experiment 
can also be applied in this instance by replacing the philosophical zombie with an artificially intelligent 
agent: if the AI agent is a logically possible concept and if an AI agent were to claim that it is conscious 
and human, then this claim does not seem falsifiable. More generally, this is known as the “problem of 
other minds,” and it is worth considering in the context of AI for its ethical implications, since a lack of 
falsifiability results in a lack of a clear way to determine whether potential strong AI is deserving of moral 
consideration. 
So, what does this mean for the future of artificial intelligence in terms of falsificationist 
methodology? For the immediate future of AI, it is probably not a significant concern, since the 
possibility of strong AI is a long-term—but not unlikely—research goal, as scholars note in Research 
Priorities for Robust and Beneficial Intelligence (Russell et. al, 2015). The real concern is that our current 
methodology is not adequate for evaluating hypotheses regarding the scientific understanding and design 
                                               
12 Critics of Chalmers, such as Dennett, argue that zombies are logically and/or metaphysically impossible and therefore dismiss 
the p-zombie thought experiment. However, the physicalism versus dualism debate is not significant to the issue of falsifying 
zombie/AI’s personhood that is presented in this paper. 
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of future artificial intelligence because falsifiability is not reachable. Either we should: (1) aim to better 
define the concepts in philosophy of mind that we attribute to artificial intelligence, like ‘personal 
identity’, ‘thinking’, and especially ‘intelligence’ itself, to understand how they can be falsified in order to 
make quicker and more meaningful progress in AI or (2) adapt our current scientific methodology to 
something more appropriate and inclusive than Popper’s falsificationism, because perhaps there are 
concepts, such as aspects of AI, that simply cannot be falsified, yet are still scientifically valid and worthy 
of research13. In Popperian style, this much, at least, seems to get us a little closer to the truth about the 



























                                               
13 Possible directions this could take include, but are not limited to (1) embracing Thomas Kuhn’s pre-paradigm chaos as a way 
in which we can make valid scientific progress or (2) adopting Paul Feyerabend’s rejection of epistemological methodology 
outlined in Against Method (Feyerabend, 1993) and instead favoring a more relativistic, anarchistic approach to doing science.  
  9 
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